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Dispute Settlement at the WTO and the Dole 
Commission: USTR Resources and Success
∗  
Gary R. Saxonhouse 
I. The Passage of the Uruguay Round Agreements and the Dole Commission 
After more than seven years of negotiation the Uruguay Round concluded with an historic 
agreement on December 15, 1993. Exactly four months later documents implementing this 
agreement were signed by representatives of the 117 Uruguay Round participants at a ministerial 
meeting at Marrakesh, Morocco. Even so, this signed agreement required ratification at home by 
the relevant legislative bodies of the agreement signatories. 
Ratification of the Uruguay Round Agreements was viewed as virtually certain in all 
countries except the United States. While the new World Trade Organization was set to begin 
operations on January 1, 1995, as late as October, 1994, Senate Finance Committee Chair, Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan, could claim only 26 committed yes votes.
1 Many senators, including the 
Republican Minority Leader, Robert Dole, were said to be concerned about the WTO’s newly 
enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM). The critical element of the revised DSM is the 
absence of the right of any country acting alone to block the formation of a Dispute Settlement 
panel or the adoption of panel findings. As the DSM had operated under the GATT, veto power 
was held, effectively, even by the accused party. In fact, this power was used in significant 
instances by losing parties to block adverse panel findings against them.
2 Under the WTO, 
however, panels get set up and proceed with their investigations and panel findings are adopted 
unless the WTO Council decides otherwise by consensus.
3 This is the polar opposite of the older 
modus operandi, and it was the loss of national sovereignty implicit in this new arrangement to 
which many senators objected. 
That there should have been Congressional objections to the new DSM is ironic. In the 1988 
Omnibus Trade Act that gave the Reagan Administration fast-track authority for the Uruguay 
Round, Congress mandated U.S. trade officials “to negotiate for more effective and expeditious 
dispute settlement mechanism and procedures” that would “enable better enforcement of U.S. 
rights.”
4 Actually, the inclusion of such language in the Trade Act of 1988 should be no surprise. 
U.S. interest in a revised DSM is of very long standing. Already during the Tokyo Round, the 
United States pressed both for an end to the single country veto and for expedited procedures.
5  
In Fall 1994, populist fears about the loss of sovereignty to the WTO were such that Senator 
Dole reported that his office was receiving 2,000 phone calls a day from opponents of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement.
6 Notwithstanding, on November 23, 1994, he agreed to support the enabling 
legislation and to encourage all Republican senators to support it in exchange for White House 
support for a Dole-conceived WTO “escape hatch.” The escape hatch would be embodied in 
legislation to be introduced the following year that would establish a WTO Dispute Settlement 
Review Commission.
7 Dole intended that  
•  The Commission would consist of five Federal appellate judges appointed by the President in 
consultation with the leadership of both Houses and Chairmen and Ranking Members of the 
Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee. 
•  It would review all final WTO dispute settlement reports adverse to the United States to 
determine whether the panel exceeded its authority or acted outside the scope of the 
agreement. Following issuance of any affirmative determination by the Commission any 
member of either House would be able to introduce a joint resolution calling on the President 
to negotiate new dispute settlement rules that would address and correct the problem. 
•  If there were three affirmative determinations in any five-year period, any member of either 
House could introduce a joint resolution to disapprove U.S. participation in the WTO – and if 
the resolution were enacted by Congress and signed by the President, the United States would 
commence withdrawal from the WTO.    2 
   
II. The History of the Dole Commission 
Despite the wide-spread publicity given the Clinton-Dole WTO agreement and despite the Senate 
having passed the WTO implementing legislation on December 1, 1994, in the six years that have 
ensued, the so-called “Dole Commission” has not been set up. As early as January 4, 1995, on the 
very first day of the new Congress, with Republicans in control of both Houses for the first time in 
forty years, Senator Dole introduced legislation creating the Commission.
8 The bill was identical 
with the terms of the late November agreement with the exception of one significant provision. 
Section 7 of the proposed legislation would have guaranteed participation by private parties in the 
proceedings before the dispute-settlement panels. 
Guaranteeing participation of private parties in dispute-settlement-panel proceedings, while it 
did not deter many of the Senate’s leading figures on trade policy from co-sponsoring the bill, 
including Senators Moynihan, Baucus, D’Amato, Grassley, Murkowski, Lott, Pressler, Santorum 
and Simon, it was as controversial in 1995 as it is today.
9 The hearings held by the Senate Finance 
Committee on the Dole legislation found wide disagreement on this issue between two former 
Deputy United State Trade Representatives. Alan Wolff argued such private participation was 
necessary because 
“… even the best lawyer cannot do a first-rate job if he or she does not have the time or 
resources to devote to a case. The reality is that these very capable people at USTR are 
already overworked and if the WTO system spawns even more international trade 
litigation before panels, they will be stretched even thinner …. The result is that the 
United States will lose cases it should win.”
10 
Alan Holmer countered that 
“… in dispute settlement, the U.S. Government needs to be able to act efficiently and 
speak with one voice. This is not a mere theoretical issue. Some WTO cases will involve 
issues that have a direct economic impact on dozens of U.S. industries, trade associations, 
or companies. Will each of them have the right to represent the interests of the United 
States before the panel? What if, while supporting the overall U.S. Government position 
(USG), their view of the law or the facts is different from that of the USG? Moreover, 
inevitably there will be differences in strategic approaches to cases, particularly where 
the best U.S. legal argument in one case may have a detrimental interest in another case. 
The role of the Administration in dispute settlement proceedings is not to represent one 
company or interest group. Rather, its role is to represent the national interest.”
11 
The Clinton Administration took Ambassador Holmer’s side in this dispute and refused to 
support the legislation as Senator Dole had submitted it.
12 It was only in the following November 
that the original Dole legislation was re-introduced, this time with offending Section 7 removed.
13 
In his eagerness to have this legislation passed prior to the beginning of the 1996 presidential 
primaries in which he would be a candidate and in which he would face protectionist opposition, 
Senator Dole agreed to allow Robert Byrd, a very senior Democratic member of the Senate, to 
submit an amendment that would set up two new WTO review commissions in addition to the one 
comprised of members of the Federal judiciary. One commission would consist of senators whose 
mandate would be to review all aspects of the WTO’s workings and to recommend legislation 
wherever appropriate. This commission of senators would be advised by a second commission 
comprised of trade lawyers, former government officials, scholars and labor leaders.
14  
  The Byrd Amendment doomed the Dole legislation. Key members of the Senate Finance 
Committee, led by its Chair, William Roth, changed their views and now opposed the Dole 
proposal fearing first, that the new commission of senators would be a threat to the Finance 
Committee’s jurisdiction over trade issues, and, second, that the private-sector commission would 
be prone to domination by special interests.
15 This latter concern was also shared by the Clinton 
Administration. One last attempt was made to pass this legislation during the last few days before 
Senator Dole’s resignation from the Senate. A compromise was reached to drop the new 
commission of senators and to refashion the private sector commission so that 1) half the 
nominees would be appointed by the White House and 2) the new commission would report 
directly to the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways & Means Committee.




Notwithstanding this compromise, opposition from protectionist textile interests, who were hostile 
to anything that might legitimize the WTO in any way, was sufficient to prevent the legislation 
from coming to a vote at that time.
17 In fact, while periodically re-introduced, the legislation was 
not voted on in that Congress at all, nor in any subsequent Congress.
18 
III. Congressional Review of WTO Treatment of U.S. Interests 
While the WTO Dispute Settlement Review Act has never been passed by Congress and does 
not have any immediate prospect of passage, the sovereignty issues raised at the time that it was 
under active consideration remain politically salient. There may be no federal judiciary review of 
WTO decisions adverse to U.S. interests, but the Uruguay Round Agreements Act does require a 
five year review for the Congress by the USTR of U.S. participation in the WTO.
19 This report 
appeared in late February 2000. At that time, by USTR’s count, 32 WTO cases in which the 
United States had been involved in a significant way had been completed. Of these cases, the 
United States prevailed in 24, either as a result of a Dispute Settlement panel finding or because of 
a settlement highly favorable to U.S. interests prior to a formal panel report being issued. The 
USTR, emphasizing both the large number of cases in which the United States prevailed, 
particularly as a plaintiff, and the overall high win-rate, concluded that the DSM is operating in a 
way highly beneficial to U.S. interests.
20 By implication, by these indices, the USTR suggests that 
the fears that spawned the original interest in the Dole Commission were unwarranted. Indeed, the 
U.S. rate of success with the DSM since the WTO commenced is slightly better than it was during 
the 1980s when the DSM first came to be used intensively as means of resolving trade disputes.
21  
Whatever the views of the USTR, and irregardless of the non-existence of the Dole 
Commission, the same section of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act that provides for a five-year 
review of U.S. participation in the WTO, also provides that within 90 days of Congress receiving 
this report, just as with the Dole Commission bill, any member may introduce a joint resolution of 
both Houses calling for U.S. withdrawal from the WTO.
22 Such a resolution must be placed on the 
calendar for action no later than 45 days after being introduced. If passed by the Congress and 
signed by the President, it would trigger U.S. withdrawal subject to the six months advance 
notification required by the WTO’s Article XV. In response to the USTR’s five-year report and 
citing the eight decisions that have gone against the United States, a joint resolution calling for 
U.S. withdrawal from the WTO was introduced within a matter of days of the report’s release.
23 
Because of the expedited schedule required by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, hearings were 
held on the resolution within a month of its filing. A little more than two months after hearings 
were held, the resolution was voted down on the House floor by a margin of 363 to 56, a margin 
of victory much wider than the 288-146 vote on whether to join the WTO in November, 1994.
24 
Notwithstanding the December 1999 turmoil at the failed WTO Summit in Seattle, Congressional 
support for the WTO was stronger than it had been five years earlier. Significantly, during the 
floor debate on the joint resolution, the USTR’s high rate of success at the WTO was raised 
repeatedly by opponents of the resolution.
25 
IV. Resources and U.S. Performance at the WTO 
It is possible that the absence of a review commission composed of respected jurists may actually 
increase the political sensitivity of each adverse WTO outcome for the United States and lead to 
undue focus on quantitative indicators of success at the DSM. In this connection, the resources 
that the USTR has at its disposal to pursue litigation at the WTO does become an issue. It may be 
as Alan Wolff forecast in his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee that the USTR is 
losing cases it should win at the WTO because its lawyers are “overworked.”
26 While it may seem 
obvious that more resources should strengthen the position of the United States in international 
economic disputes, senior U.S. trade officials have often taken the opposite view. Ambassador 
Mickey Kantor, when he was USTR, argued that his agency’s great virtue was its small size, and 
that this small size was the key to its success.
27 Whether because of Ambassador Kantor’s views, 
or because of the constraints imposed by the large Federal budget deficits that Congress faced 
during much of the 1990s, despite the creation of the WTO, NAFTA, and APEC, to mention just a 
few new responsibilities, until the very last months of the Clinton Administration, USTR was no    4 
   
larger than it was in 1993 when the Clinton Administration took office.
28 USTR had 203 full-time 
equivalent authorized positions in both fiscal year 1993 and in fiscal year 2000. In recent years, 
USTR Charlene Barshefsky regularly asked for, but was denied large increases in her staff.
29 
Finally, only a few months before her departure from public life, Congress did approve 
Ambassador Barshefsky’s request for 25 new full-time, career positions within USTR.
30 
V. Resources, Success and Success Rates 
Now that the USTR’s size is changing, what can be expected to happen to U.S. performance at the 
WTO? To analyze this issue, and leaving aside until Section VII of this paper all questions of 
strategic behavior including reactions of trading partners,
31 assume that the USTR has the utility 
function:
32 
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where  
a(X, δ ) is the proportion of cases won at the WTO 
b(X, δ ) is the number of cases won at the WTO 
X is the number of cases brought before the WTO 
δ  is the resources the USTR will use above the minimum K required per case 
The utility function posited here reflects USTR interest, as evident in its recent report on U.S. 
performance at the WTO, and in the Congressional debate on continued U.S. participation in the 
WTO, in its success-rate as well as in its total number of wins. Note further that f(y) is the ‘base’ 
probability that case number ‘y’ is won by the US, with f '(y)<0, that is, potential WTO cases can 
be ordered according to their probability of success on the assumption that only K resources are 
used per case. The probability of success can be affected by δ  g(δ ) is the increased likelihood that 
any particular case is won due to 'extra' resources (independent of which case): 
g’(δ )>0, g"(δ )<0  with            ) X ( f lim ) ( g lim X 0 1 → ∞ → − < δ δ    
(Impossible to guarantee any win). 
The problem for the USTR is: 
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where m is the total resources available to the USTR. 
VI. The Comparative Statics of the USTR’s Problem 
The total number of U.S. wins at the WTO is clearly increasing in USTR resources
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This presumably is the relationship that Ambassador Wolff had in mind. Once again, as in the 
USTR report on the WTO, Congressional debate on continued U.S. participation in the WTO, and 
Ambassador Barshefsky’s own Congressional testimony makes clear, however, there is also 
interest in a, the rate of success. Here the results are ambiguous: 













, which can be positive or negative. 
This can be restated as the effect that marginal resources have on the marginal success rate 
depends on the effect of marginal resources on the impact of each of the USTR’s two possible 
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Using the results from Appendices 1 and 2, decreasing (increasing) g"(δ
*), that is a lessening 




, and therefore 
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 is increased (decreased) while 
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dX
 is decreased 
(increased), thereby increasing (decreasing) 
dm
da
. In other words, the less (more) rapidly the 
effectiveness of marginal resources used per case (g"(δ
*)) is falling (from the equilibrium amount 
of resources per case, 
* K δ + ), the greater (smaller) the share of any increase in marginal 
resources will be used to increase resources per case. Because resources per case is what is 
assumed to increase WTO success rates, less (more) rapid marginal decline in the effect of 
resources used per case correspond with greater resources increasing (lowering) success rates. 
Decreasing (increasing) f"(X
*), that is, increasing (decreasing) the rate at which the ‘base’ 
success rate is falling at X
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 is increased (decreased), 
dm
dX
 is decreased (increased) and 
dm
da
 is increased. This 
means the more rapidly (slowly) the probability of success with a new case at the WTO (f '(X)) is 
falling (from the marginal U.S. WTO case, 
* X , in equilibrium), the lower (higher) the share of 
any marginal increases in resources that will go towards bringing additional U.S. cases at the 
WTO. Instead, more of these marginal increases in resources will go towards increasing resources 
per case (starting new cases) and therefore to higher (lower) success rates. 
The impact that USTR preferences have on the allocation of its resources can be seen with the 
use of the first-order conditions: 
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Substituting this into  () () λ δ δ X ’ g XU ’ g U b a = +  gives: 
() () ( ) λ δ δ m ’ g mU U K b a = + + . 
Suppose there is an increase (decrease) in importance to the USTR of the success rate. 
Because utility is homogeneous in degree zero the comparative statics for such a change are the 
same sign as if Ua is increased (decreased) and Ub decreased (increased) in the ratio necessary to 
leave λ  unchanged. Since g"(δ )<0 and the above condition must hold for all utility functions, δ  





X , this means that X must decrease (increase). Because 
the USTR success rate at the WTO is increasing in δ  and decreasing in X, the success rate 
increases (decreases).  
The results in this section are also presented in figure 1.
34 m
o is the original resource 
constraint, m' is the new resource constraint, and wUSTR is the USTR iso-welfare curve through the 
original equilibrium.  a
o is the locus of points with a
o proportion of wins, and b
o is the locus of 
points with b
o wins. Points to the left (right) and below (above) a
o represent a higher (lower) 
proportion of wins than a
o . Points to the right (left) and above (below) b
o represent a higher 
(lower) number of wins. With the new resource constraint m', if the new equilibrium is to the left 
(right) and above (below) a
o, this will be the outcome most consistent with Ambassador Wolff’s 
(Kantor’s) 1995 Congressional testimony. Where this new equilibrium will be depends critically 
(though not exclusively) on the shape of a
o, which, in turn, depends on g"(δ ) and f"(y).     6 
   
It does appear that the view implicit in Congressional appropriations for USTR until last year, 
and explicit in Ambassador Kantor’s remarks, under some conditions, can be correct. Less 
resources for the USTR can mean a higher success rate. In thinking about this issue, it is important 
to keep in mind that it is the USTR itself that ultimately controls the number of U.S. cases that go 
before the WTO. The more cases the USTR allows to go before a dispute settlement panel, the 
more cases it will win. But assuming the cases with the highest chance of success at the WTO are 
taken there first, the more cases it will also lose.
35 To the extent that both the number of successes 
and the rate of success are politically salient, there is a trade-off here. The trade-off will depend on 
how quickly the probability of success in an additional case taken to the WTO declines by 
comparison with how much investing additional resources on cases already at the WTO raises the 
probability of success with them. Depending on how much the USTR values the number of 
successes versus success rates will determine together with these two factors how its resources are 
allocated. If additional cases bring with them very low probability of success by comparison with 
investing additional resources in existing cases, new resources for the USTR will raise both the 
success rate and the number of wins. Paradoxically, if there remain promising cases that are not 
being brought to the WTO because of a lack of resources, new resources for the USTR can lower 
its rate of success at the WTO even while it increases the number of wins. 
VII. USTR Behavior and MITI Reactions 
The preceding analysis assumes that the USTR values all cases equally. It also does not discuss 
reactions that U.S. trading partners might make in response to an increase in USTR resources. 
Suppose instead these possibilities are now allowed for in a simple example.
36 Assume that USTR 
and MITI are contesting two cases before the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. The issue is 
how USTR and MITI will split their resources. Suppose USTR’s utility function is 
U = α a + β b*, 
a special case of the utility function used in the preceding sections. While a is still the win rate 
with wins unweighted, b* now weights wins according to their importance to USTR. When b* is 
calculated, the first case is weighted more significantly than the second. USTR gives Case 1 a 
weighting of 1, while Case 2 is given a weighting of w. 
1 > w > 0  
is the amount USTR weights a win in Case 2. As before, the more resources USTR uses per case, 
the greater the chance of winning that case. Once again, K resources are the ‘base’ resources used 
per case (here set exogenously to 0). τ  are the additional resources the USTR will use for the first 
case. n represents total USTR resources (set exogenously to 1).  
MITI is assumed to have a utility function of the same form as USTR. 
U' = ρ c + θ  d* 
c is MITI’s win rate and d* is its weighted number of wins. For MITI, Case 1 also has a weight of 
1, while Case 2 is weighted h with 
1 > h > 0 
As is likely, both USTR and MITI will find Case 1 more important. For MITI, as for USTR, the 
more resources, the more likely a case will be won before the USTR. K are the base resources that 
MITI uses per case (here also set exogenously to zero). γ  are the extra MITI’s resources used for 
Case 1. m are MITI’s total resources (also set exogenously to 1) 
As before, there is an exogenous ‘base’ probability that USTR will win each of the two cases. 
This probability is denoted f(1) and f(2) for Cases 1 and 2, respectively. Resources affect USTR 
chances according to the following relationship, also a special case of the function used in the 
preceding sections. 
µτγ γ τ − − + − − = v e v e g(case)  
where 
v > 0 is a measure of the effect of extra resources (set exogenously to 2) 
µ  > 0 is a measure of the degree of strategic interaction (set exogenously to 1). 
For the purposes of illustration here, it is assumed that USTR acts as a strategic substitute. The 
more resources that MITI puts on one case, the less valuable USTR’s resources on that case 




acts as a strategic complement.
37 The more resources that USTR puts on a case, the more valuable 
MITI’s resources on that case become and the more resources that MITI wants to put on that case. 
From the above, USTR maximizes 
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The second-order condition is satisfied for the assumed parameters: 
0 2 1 < − − − ) v e v ( ) x ( τ β  
In the same way, MITI maximizes 
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γ . 
Once again, the second-order condition is satisfied for the assumed parameters: 
0 2 1 < − − − ) v e v ( ) h ( γ θ . 
Table 1 summarizes the equilibria for the setup just presented. The base case assumes α  = β  = 
ρ  = θ  = 1 and h = w = 0.5. .05 values for h and w mean that Case 1 is much more important to 
both USTR and MITI than is Case 2. 
The baseline in Table 1 indicates how USTR and MITI divide the extra increment of 
resources that each gets. Despite USTR and MITI both valuing the first case twenty times more 
than the second, USTR, unlike MITI, will devote a disproportionate amount of its resources to 
Case 2. This result follows from the assumption that the USTR acts as a strategic substitute and 
MITI as a strategic complement. 
∆ 1 explores what happens when USTR puts less of a weight on Case 2 than does MITI. 
Unsurprisingly relative to the baseline, USTR becomes more likely to win Case 1 and less likely 
to win Case 2. More surprisingly in ∆  2, when USTR puts more weight on Case 2 than does MITI, 
giving USTR more resources, when MITI will get matching resources, will make it less likely that 
USTR will win Case 2 while it is more likely to win Case 1 relative to the outcome in the baseline. 
With ∆  3 the more important USTR and MITI find Case 2 relative to Case 1, the more likely 
relative to the baseline, USTR is to win Case 1, but the less likely it is to win Case 2. 
∆  4 and ∆ 5 explore how the allocation of incremental resources for USTR and MITI changes 
when, unlike the baseline and the preceding simulation, USTR and MITI place different weights 
on the success rates and the winning of cases weighted by their importance. Surprisingly for ∆ 4 
the more importance that USTR places on the success rate relative to MITI, the less likely it is to 
win Case 2, while becoming no more likely to win Case 1. For ∆ 5, and in contrast with the results 
for USTR, if MITI places relatively more importance on success rates than does USTR, MITI 
becomes more likely to win Case 2, but somewhat less likely to win Case 1.  
From the perspective of the issues discussed in the preceding section, in each instance (though 
least for the base case), extra resources actually lower the success rate for USTR. Even for ∆ 4, the 
more important the success rate for USTR, with extra resources for both USTR and MITI, the 
lower the success rate is likely to be for them. Unlike the preceding section, this finding does not 
follow from extra resources encouraging USTR to take on additional cases with a low probability 
of success. Rather as a strategic substitute, it is poorly suited to improve its welfare in an 
environment where both sides have more resources. For example, were USTR to attempt to bring 
only the first case and not the second to the WTO, both USTR and MITI would put all their 
resources on this case and g(1) = - 1. For the setup here, it makes sense for USTR to try both 
cases. The results for MITI, which are the exact opposite of those for USTR, show that for a    8 
   
strategic complement, more resources can lead to both a higher success rate and a greater 
likelihood of winning the most important cases notwithstanding USTR getting the same increment 
in new resources. 
VIII. Consistency and the Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
Since the enhancement of the DSM with the creation of the WTO, there has been an upsurge in its 
use. During the 1980s, 127 complaints were taken to the DSM.
38 During its first five years of 
operation alone, the WTO’s DSM has received 185 complaints.
39 U.S. use of the DSM reflects 
these general trends. Between 1980 and the beginning of 1990, the United States brought 39 
complaints to the DSM.
40 Between 1995 and the beginning of 2001, the United States has brought 
60 complaints.
41 This implies an increase in the annual incidence of complaining to the WTO by 
the United States of over 200%. 
The greatly increased U.S. use of the DSM cannot be the result of increased resources. In the 
late 1990s, the USTR budget has been no greater than it was in the 1980s. Nor does it seem likely, 
given all the emphasis on USTR’s success rate a, that in recent years more emphasis is being put 
on total successes b.
42 Rather, it has been suggested that the WTO’s DSM might be used more 
often now because the Uruguay Round Agreements texts, being new, are inherently ambiguous.
43 
A more predictable environment allows parties to a conflict to save themselves the trouble of 
using up scarce resources by resolving their dispute outside the WTO, anticipating what would 
happen if they went through the DSM process. While this is a plausible view of the relationship 
between uncertainty and the use of the DSM, in theory, the inverse relationship is also plausible. 
Consider the following. 
Suppose USTR has a case that it believes has merit ϕ . It is assumed USTR’s information 
about the merit of the case that it can take to the WTO is private information.
44 If USTR takes the 
case to the DSM, it will get: 
(1 - ρ ) ϕ  + ρ  ε  , 
where ρ  is a noise parameter and ε  is a population mean of a random drawing of possible remedies 
for USTR’s complaints. Both USTR and MITI know ρ  and ε . If ρ  = 1, the DSM result is pure 
noise, if ρ  = 0, there will be an outcome with merit ϕ . Suppose that MITI offers p settlement to 
USTR. MITI gets − p, if USTR accepts but  )] ( ) 1 ( r [ ρε + ϕ ρ − + −  if USTR rejects where n is the 
resource cost of pursuing the case at WTO. 
USTR will accept p if  ρε ϕ ρ + − ≥ ) ( p 1  or  ϕ ρ ρε ≥ − − ) /( ) p ( 1 . MITI’s expected payoff 
(not knowing ϕ ) is: 
) ( dF } r ) {( ]
p












where F is prior on ϕ . 
Solving for offer p in equilibrium, the first-order condition is: 
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when F is uniform  n p + = ερ  (ε  = ½). 
In this case USTR will accept if: 






Thus, with a uniform distribution, more noise ρ : 
1) increases offer p; 
2) increases the probability that the conflict will not be taken to the WTO. 
This suggests that it may not be a new, untested and unpredictable WTO that is generating more 
cases. In fact, the set-up allows the inference that perhaps the new WTO’s DSM is more rather 
than less predictable than the GATT’s forty-year old DSM.




findings accepted except if opposed by a consensus of WTO Council Members) of the new DSM 
may make the whole WTO more predictable than before, notwithstanding the inevitable vagueness 
of a new trade treaty.
46 And, because it is more predictable than before, it is being used.
47 
IX. Conclusions 
At the time the Uruguay Round Agreements were passed by Congress, particular concern was 
expressed about their implications for U.S. national sovereignty. Concern was sufficiently great 
that the Clinton Administration committed its support to the creation of a commission that would 
review each adverse decision against the United States by the WTO. The commission was 
designed such that the outcome of its review process might trigger a serious Congressional 
consideration of U.S. withdrawal from the WTO.  
While the so-called Dole Commission was never created, the Congressional controversy 
surrounding the ratification of the Uruguay Round Agreement has led to particular concern with 
USTR performance at the WTO. Curiously, enhanced Congressional concern has not gone hand in 
hand with more resources for USTR. Over the 1990s, USTR has rarely asked for, and, until 2000 
has not received additional resources for its work. 
The analysis here shows that if the USTR is concerned not only about the number of cases it 
wins but also about its rate of success, having more resources may have an ambiguous impact on 
the USTR’s rate of success. Depending on how relatively promising are the additional cases that 
may yet be brought by USTR to the WTO, and how usefully additional resources may be applied 
to existing cases, it is possible that more resources can lower USTR’s success rate. This is true, 
though for different reasons, when explicit allowance is made for the response by the other party 
to the dispute to a USTR commitment of additional resources. 
More resources cannot explain the increased use that the USTR has made since the WTO was 
established, because until recently USTR has received no additional resources. Rather, a more 
predictable DSM may have encouraged more rather than fewer cases to be brought to the WTO in 
preference to further efforts at extra-WTO bilateral settlements. 
Appendix 1 
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The USTR’s problem written as a LaGrangean is: 
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These three equations can be solved as a system to find 
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Table 1. USTR and MITI: Likelihood of Success with Incremental Resources and Differential Weights on Outcomes 
   Baseline    ∆  1a  ∆  1b  ∆  2a  ∆  2b  ∆  3  ∆  4a  ∆  4b  ∆  5a  ∆  5b 
  α   1  1  1 1  1 1  1.25  1.5 1 1 
  β   1 1 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
  ρ   1 1 1  1  1  1  1  1  1.25  1.5 
  θ   1 1 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
action  δ   0.1825 0.21  0.24 0.16  0.14  .1845  0.15  0.12  .225  .265 
action  γ   0.8093  0.75  0.67  0.78  0.75 .7612  .771  .732 .705 .601 
  h  .05  0.1 0.15 0.05  0.05  .075 0.05  0.05  0.05 0.05 
  x 0.05  0.5 0.5  0.1  0.15  .075 0.05  0.05  0.05 0.05 
result g (case 1)    -.6437  -.59  -.52  -.6408  -.637  -.6137  -.6415  -.6431  -.552  -.4473 
result g (case 2)    .332  .203  0.05  0.27  0.21  .2298  .25402  .1772  .1134  -.073 
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